BOOK REVIEW

CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA,

STEVEN GOLDBERG,

New York University Press (1994) (255 pages) ($29.95).
Reviewed by
BRIAN M. O'CONNELL*

In 1956, physicist C.P. Snow introduced his seminal observations on the split between science and the rest of the world in a
series of lectures.1 Snow noted that scientists and non-scientists
constituted separate cultures and in assessing each other, formulated "misinterpretations which are dangerous."2 While citing such
problems as world equality and economic development, both Snow
and his contemporary, Bertrand Russell believed that the most immediate danger of the schism was global destruction through the
new technique of atomic fission.' These ruminations reflect an
abiding fascination with science and its relationship to society,
characterized by on commentator as seldom managing to bridge
"the large and dark domain of public ignorance" which pervades
the subject.4
In Culture Clash: Law and Science in America, Steven Goldberg
revisits the "paradoxical" nature of science in the contemporary
setting of post-cold war America.' Goldberg, a Professor of Law at
the Georgetown University Law Center claims that the paradox
manifests itself in the wide financial and social support which science receives despite the fact that it frequently delivers ambiguous
* J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 1987, B.A. Trinity College, Hartford, 1983.
1 See C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES AND THE ScIENTIFic REVOLUTION 1 (1961)
(citation omitted).
2 Id. at 6.
3 Id. at 48; BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY 75 (1953).
Russell emphasized that a clear "choice [must be made] between Reason and Death.
And by 'Reason' I mean willingness to submit to law as declared by an international
authority." Id. at 76.
4 Jacques Barzun, Forward to STEPHEN TOULMIN, FORESIGHT 9 (1961).
5 STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 1 (1994).
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or disappointing returns. Goldberg's thesis, similar to Snow's, is
that while science and law dominate contemporary culture, their
interaction is rarely considered, and hence often appears mysterious. When subjected to "cross-cultural" examination, these disciplines reveal very different goals and processes; however both law
and science share a common ground at the point where the public
becomes involved-either as a source of funding or as the recipient of its products. In either case, "the primary social testing
ground for scientific developments with public policy implications"
is the forum of public policy and law.6
Goldberg begins his analysis with the significant undertaking
of offering comprehensive definitions of legal and scientific reasoning. These definitions are important, as they remain a theme
throughout the book, and arguably constrain the development of
its conclusions. Science, the author observes, is held in popular
awe because of its seemingly progressive nature. It appeals to our
collective intellects by representing a body of knowledge which is at
once cumulative and testable against objective criteria.7 Goldberg
admits that some "important modern scholars" would reject the
simplicity of this definition in favor of a more culturally-dependent, cognitively relative version. Nonetheless, without further explication, the author dispenses with these revisionists as "even from
this perspective, science ends up appearing a good deal more progress oriented than other fields of human endeavor.""
Consistent with this paradigm, the author characterizes science as a relatively cohesive community that reaches consensus
through self-governance, based upon shared norms and a belief in
the value of progress. An additional implication of this definition
is that scientists derive primary satisfaction from the discovery of
knowledge, and not from direct social approbation. In this light,
the link between science and technology becomes tenuous,
"whereas science can directly aid society [through practical applications], traditional scientists cannot rely on that as a sole or even
fundamental motivation for their work."9 Scientists, in Goldberg's
view, do science for the sake of science itself.
In contrast, law is described as not fundamentally concerned
with knowledge for its own sake, but as a means of peaceful dispute
Id. at
7 Id. at
8 Id. at
9 Id. at
6

5.
8.
8-9.
13.
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resolution." Consequently, law focuses upon social accommodation and procedural integrity, and is not amenable to the precision
which accompanies scientific investigation. On the contrary, law's
solutions are pragmatic and accommodating, frequently trading
aesthetic elegance for acceptable results.
As an example of the legal process meeting scientific progress,
the author explores Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals." Still
the subject of controversy, the 1993 United States Supreme Court
decision confronted the issue of whether "non-traditional" science,
that is, techniques which are not "generally accepted within the
scientific community,"1 2 could be the subject of expert witness testimony. The question led to heated debate among scientists. The
traditional scientists argued that "pseudoscience" or "junkscience"
should be excluded from the courtroom. In opposition were those
scientists convinced that limiting this information would constitute
dangerous censorship, perpetuating a stifling scientific orthodoxy.
In the end, the court crafted a judicial compromise, holding that
scientific acceptance, publication, and testing were indeed factors
in the consideration of scientific testimony. Nevertheless, the task
of admitting such evidence was committed to discretion of the trial
judge.
Goldberg uses Daubert as an example of a relatively painless
resolution of a law and science conflict. The author convincingly
argues that in such situations, "[t]here is no reason why lawyers
and scientists cannot comprehend the different nature of the
other's work and appreciate it when it is being done well."1 3 While
many problems can be reconciled within the framework of compromise, more intractable issues "arise when law and science begin
to infringe on each other's turf." 4 This situation occurs, the author explains, when the values held by lawyers collide with those
which animate scientists. Not surprisingly, these instances usually
occur when there is social concern around an issue involving high
levels of technical information. The author expands upon this
premise by presenting contemporary conflicts which in his opinion, "arise largely from vastly different legal attitudes toward basic
10 Id.
11 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); see GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 20-23 (examining
Daubert).
12 The "generally accepted" criteria, known popularly as the Frye test, is derived
from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13 GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 23.
14 Id.
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research as opposed to the application of that research."' 5
Professor Goldberg offers a comprehensive and worthwhile
overview of science's intimate involvement with the American experience. He traces America's collective fascination with science to
our Constitutional Framer's intrigue with the Enlightenment.1 6
The discoveries of Newton and Galileo not only changed science,
but served as the inspiration for citizen-scientists such as Jefferson,
Franklin, and Rush, who believed that the tenants of knowledge
and progress provided fundamental tools for the construction of
an effective democracy. For the author, the most dramatic impact
of the sciences upon government takes place within the Constitution, specifically within the First Amendment.' 7
A review of early Constitutional writings reveals that the Framers held fast to the belief that scientific progress was concurrent
with the preservation of civil liberty.' The author concisely lays
out writings of Jefferson and other founders which detail the need
to protect scientific advancement by guaranteeing non-interference in its ability to publish. Goldberg illustrates how this concern
has not been lost in the courts, citing Roth v. United States 9 , among
other cases, to demonstrate how such competing and contentious
value judgments as obscenity are dealt with safely outside the forum of scientific inquiry.2"
In addition to the passive protection, Professor Goldberg
shows how the early Congress, working in conjunction with perceived Constitutional dictates, set precedents for active governmental support of scientific and quasi-scientific endeavors such as
military research, weights and measures, surveying, and the promotion of invention.2 ' Aside from these activities, which are justified
through the Constitution's national defense clause,' Congressional coinage power, 23 and the patent clause, 24 the author demonstrates a more subtle, but equally pervasive, link of science to the
improvement of general welfare through Congress's spending
power. This wider power first manifested itself in the creation of
15 Id.

16 Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
17 Id. at 28.
18 Id. at 28-29.

19 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
20 GOLDBERG, supra note
21 Id. at 31-32.
22
23
24

U.S. CONST. art. I,
U.S. CONST. art. I,
U.S. CONST. art. I,

5, at 29.

§ 8, cl. 12.
§ 8, cl. 5.
§ 8, cl. 8.
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the Department of Agriculture and land grant colleges.2 5
From early federal involvement to present governmental initiatives, science has enjoyed a privileged political position, which is
consistent with what the author terms its "central role" in the
American tradition.2 6 Scientific research has been vested with bipartisan approval as a necessary force for social equality, progress,
and hope. Consequently, Congress has accorded unique legislative
status to the funding and regulation of scientific projects.
The foremost method of governmental funding of scientific
research is through agency regulation. Goldberg notes that
"agency control over science funding is so well established that deviations from the pattern attract considerable attention."2 7 According to the author, this arrangement reflects a long-held belief that
science should not be the pawn of special interests or political
agendas. In the majority of situations, this arrangement is advantageous to the public for "it is in fact true that expert agencies are
better able to manage incremental decisions in this field than are
elected officials." 8 Goldberg finds none of this broad delegation
to be problematic, and reminds the reader that not since the
1930's has the Supreme Court found any congressional delegation
to be unconstitutional.
Given the substantial interconnection between science and
the federal bureaucracy, it may be surprising that there is no single
supervisory entity or "Department of Science." Goldberg believes
that the absence of this type of entity is beneficial, as agency liaison
assures the bi-directional flow of information between Congress,
the executive branch, and science practitioners. Moreover, the
ubiquitous and diverse administrative system of scientific funding
works, according to Goldberg, protect research from "undue
[political] pressure for immediate results."2 9 Without such insulation, basic research might quickly become the victim of ephemeral
budgetary and policy concerns, possibly leading to disastrous results like Lysenkoism. °
Goldberg states that the arrangement that characterizes
agency-based scientific funding presents an extraordinary situation
25 GOLDBERG,
26 Id. at 38.
27 Id. at 45.
28 Id. at 46.
29 Id. at 51.

supra note 5, at 36-37.

30 Id. at 53. Specifically, Lysenkoism was the use of political pressure to exclude
modern Western genetics from Soviet research endeavors, thus impeding the progression of this field. See id.
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that is non-existent in other administrative contexts. Indeed, in reviewing agency decisions, Goldberg posits that the courts have abdicated any control. The source of this uncommon forbearance
can be traced to the process of peer review which dominates the
allocation of scientific funding. Unlike conventional competitions,
this method is unique in that it is not adversarial in nature. Rather
it relies greatly upon the stature of the applicant and her standing
within the scientific community. As with Goldberg's definition of
science itself, peer review decisions are based upon consensus and
community self-governance. 3 1 Thus, Goldberg explains, when
"those decisions are challenged in court, the research agencies
who are being sued argue vigorously and successfully that outsiders
should stay on the outside."3 2
To support his claim, Goldberg offers examples of court decisions which allowed wide agency latitude in granting or denying
funding applications. In one case, the applicant, called to military
service, returned to find that the Veteran's Administration had
cancelled his research grant, seemingly due to the existence of
negative rumors regarding the quality of his work. In reviewing the
matter, the court of appeals declined to reach the merits, invoking
a seldom-used provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that
exempts from review agency action committed in its discretion."
For the author, this case stands for the proposition that even if
charges of inter-collegial slander and conspiracy are incorrect, they
remain outside of the judiciary's self-defined sphere of review. 4
Through these observations, Professor Goldberg illustrates
how basic scientific research is fostered through unique legal protection. In contrast with other administrative law matters, such as
Social Security benefits claims, scientific research appears very
much immune from heavy judicial scrutiny. Consistent with his
earlier claim regarding the special place of science in American
culture, the author claims that "[t]he fundamental reason for this
abstinence is that the area of basic scientific research is one of the
few in American life in which something approaching consensus
still exists."3 5 Thus, through Constitutional and administrative pro31

Id. at 56-59.

32 Id. at 57.

See Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1969).
The author cites additional cases to demonstrate instances of 'judicial abdication," including allegations of sexual and political viewpoint discrimination and unreasonable preference in choices of investigative subjects. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at
59-61.
35 Id. at 66.
33
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cess, Goldberg convincingly demonstrates how the law has engaged
in a form of social engineering, relinquishing any claim to power
in favor of the unencumbered ability of science to proceed at its
own pace and presumably, to contribute to the greater progress of
the nation.
Goldberg offers similar observations in his review of science's
relationship to religion. The author offers concise examples to
demonstrate that throughout American history, the law has favored
scientific progress, even against formidable pressure to do otherwise. Characteristically, this predilection is traced to the Framer's
embracement of Enlightenment principles.3 6 Jefferson, Madison,
and Franklin are shown not so much to be anti-religious, but cautious in the face of historical ecclesiastical suppression of scientific
progress. Thus, states Goldberg, "the Jeffersonian wall between
church and state was designed in part to protect American
Galileos." 7
In modern times, this protection can be observed in the evolution controversy. Goldberg presents the decision of Epperson v. Arkansas," a challenge to a state statute prohibiting the teaching of
evolution, as an example of how the Supreme Court has dealt with
perceived threats to science in the name of religion. According to
Goldberg, although little evidence existed in the record to indicate
that the statute was enacted for religious purposes, the Court nevertheless found such an intent.3 9 Significantly, an amicus brief was
submitted and signed by 179 scientists urging this conclusion."
More recent challenges to evolutionary theory, in the form of
"creationism," have met with similar results. In the 1987 Supreme
Court case of Edwards v. Aguillard,'" the scientific community, including seventy-two Nobel Laureates, filed briefs urging the Court
to reject the view that a literal interpretation of Genesis enjoyed
equal footing with evolutionary theory. According to form, the
Court struck down the Louisiana statute mandating identical treatment and found, consistent with Epperson, a state-sponsored religious purpose. 42
Goldberg argues that scientific challenges to religion succeed
due to the value assigned to science by the courts. This observation
36
37
38

Id. at 69.
Id. at 71-72.

393 U.S. 97 (1968).

39 GOLDBERG,
40 Id.

41

supra note 5, at 74.

482 U.S. 578 (1987).

42 GOLDBERG,

supra note 5, at 76-77.
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is given further weight by his consideration of establishment clause
challenges to state sodomy laws, which uniformly fail.4 Religion,
in the author's opinion, is deeply involved in our social view of
homosexuality and is supported by the courts in this instance.
Thus, "[t] he establishment clause cannot be understood solely as a
statement about religion; its content depends upon the context in
which religion is operating."" In the sui generis realm of scientific
endeavor, it appears clear that the context powerfully favors its
advocates.
Although it is clear that a preference exists for the role of scientific research within American society, the exploration of scientific application is altogether different. Goldberg effectively
demonstrates that conflict results when science encounters the
sphere of public policy, and law-intensive resolution becomes the
foremost priority. Unlike funding decisions, regulatory agencies
do not stress consensus or peer review.4 5 Rather, institutions such
as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "tend toward the adversary approach that mirrors
legal norms.""6 Likewise, the courts assume an entirely different
and greatly more active role in the supervision of the dissemination
of science.
This differential is termed a regulatorygap by the author, as the
substantial chasm between basic research and eventual application.4 7 Where in the former instance, basic science is left by tacit
agreement to the community which conducts the work, the product which affects the public is the subject of intense interest and
judicial evaluation. A necessary byproduct of this delineation is a
conflict between scientific and legal values, making "the transition
from theory to practice in the realm of science and technology...
remarkably rocky." 8
With this pronouncement, Goldberg introduces a preeminent
theme of his book: the necessity for science counselors. 9 According
to the author, these individuals would be scientists pursuing active
research. These scientists also would be sensitized to social issues
affecting their endeavors. Unlike more "visible" science advocates,
science counselors would not leave their laboratories, but would
Id. at
Id. at
45 Id. at
46 Id.
47 Id. at
48 Id. at
49 Id. at
43

44

77-78.
78.
89.
94.
95.
103 (citation omitted).
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continue to practice science. Goldberg enunciates, "[t] hey may be
ordinary scientists who have absorbed the notion of social constraint into their very concept of what a scientist does." ° Goldberg
follows this proposition with a set of diverse examples to demonstrate that the modem regulatory gap is vast and has "tremendous
consequences for public policy in America today."5 ' Goldberg accentuates the need for science counselors in his examples.
The first example which Goldberg offers is the Human Genome Initiative. This "massive government undertaking" involves
the microscopic mapping of the human structure.5 2 As is characteristic for all examples in the book, the author presents a careful
explanation of the specific techniques involved and quickly links
them to probable social implications. In the case of genetic mapping, Goldberg points to the de-centrality of the endeavor as dictated by the fragmentized structure of basic science funding. The
author notes that the multiplicity of funding agencies may encourage choices available for specific research, but also cautions
that such plurality will make future regulatory policies more difficult.5" Issues involving questions of privacy versus public health
will no doubt come to the fore as will problems regarding the deterministic aspects of genetic modeling and the ethical quagmire
of eugenics. These difficult questions can be aided, states
Goldberg, through the liaison of science counselors "trying to perform the important function of calming down public expectations
about what genetics can do and of pointing up some dangers in
pushing genetic capabilities to their limits."5 4
Similarly, nuclear fusion has been the focus of popular enthusiasm as a future energy resource. Goldberg succinctly describes
the fundamentals of this technology, with careful attention to the
programmatic aspects of its development.5 5 According to the author, science counselors have already helped lay foundations for
this technology's introduction; however, the regulatory gap, in his
opinion, will be dramatic if fusion is ever introduced into mainstream use. A primary stumbling stone will be choices involved in
the type of confinement system that will be employed. 6 According
to Goldberg, this problem will occur because the current legal
50
51
52
53

54
55
56

Id. at 106.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 112.
See id. at 120.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 132-34.
Id. at 136-38.
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processes are not structured to pressure the scientific community
to consider which of the possible alternatives will be socially acceptable. Specifically, Goldberg points to the failure of Congress and
the courts to provide adequate methods of technology assessment,
including the development of early environmental impact
statements.

57

A final example of science and legal policy comes from the
field of artificial intelligence.5" Goldberg devotes considerable attention to the fascinating developments in computer-based cognition. It is beyond the scope of this review to detail each segment of
this exploration; however, important parallels are drawn between
our developing conceptions of human awareness by and through
technology. Specifically, the author provides interesting insights
into the current debate concerning the legal definition of death,
skillfully contrasting contemporary thought about the dynamics of
human interaction with recent studies regarding computer cognition. 59 This chapter, well worth reading in its own right, provides
perhaps the most imaginative and convincing argument for the
need of professionals educated in both law and science to help society confront the fantastic possibilities that technology will
present.
Through example and analysis, Goldberg presents a compelling portrait of science and law as separate in character, but mutually reliant. Modern science provides society with the hope-and
often the reality-of progress. Law shields scientific research from
interference by religious zealotry and the normal demands of the
political process. When hypothesis is transformed into application,
law allows for the voices of society at large to be heard and weighed
against the purported benefits of the technology. Goldberg correctly states that this relationship is "deeply embedded in our laws
and custom."6o His own evaluation of the situation is not critical of
this two-tiered situation, and his suggestion of a science counselor
reflects a desire to maintain the "freedom" of basic research by
keeping it insulated from "outside" interference.
This quiescence is not without its problems. Goldberg does
not dwell on contemporary sociological work, which presses the
need to critically question "not merely how science works but
whether science is working as well as it could, especially given the
Id. at 139.
See id. at 151.
59 See id at 172-77.
60 Id. at 179.
57
58
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ever-changing and ever-more-important roles that science plays in
society."6" One aspect of this social epistemologyP2 is the question of
to what degree science ought to be to accountable to its consumers. To the extent that basic science research remains isolated
from the public forum, a status which Goldberg seems to support,
there will remain not only a gap between technology and development, but between science and the rest of the world.
While certainly basic science must be encouraged by a sort of
trust relationship with the community-at-large, this arrangement
need not be as lopsided as Goldberg suggests with his science counselor proposition. Drawn only from the ranks of scientific practitioners, it is questionable as to how bilateral the counselorlayperson dialogue will be. It is equally troublesome to note that
while Goldberg supposes that scientists can become educated in
the issues of law and policy, he apparently does not accord similar
ability to professionals from the legal community. The entire issue
of the desirability of encouraging or discouraging this type of isolation is, of course, too great for the scope of this review, but it is one
which might have been a worthwhile consideration in the work. It
is certainly linked to the issue of law and the future of science for
" [w] ithout succumbing to anti-intellectualism, a democratic society
must always be suspicious of conceptions of knowledge in which
the most valued forms of knowledge are the least accessible ...
only to an elite set of consumers (e.g. other professional knowledge producers and, indirectly, their patrons)."6
Equally troubling is Goldberg's apparent readiness to accept
that the scientific research process is without internal fault or the
need for closer scrutiny. Initially, it is clear that the advent of such
modern processes as gene-splitting and nuclear research can cloud
the borders between applied and basic sciences. A mistake in a
"basic science" experiment may have profound societal effects of,
until recently, unthinkable proportion. This reality, at the very
least, provides a cautionary note to the proposition that basic research does best when left to itself.
On a more metaphysical level, there is deep controversy as to
whether basic science itself is as "pure" in character as most of its
biographers and apologists have assumed.6 4 There exist numerous
61
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Id. at 391.
Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
64 See, e.g., MICnAL POLANI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1957).
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studies which suggest that research is conducted with internal,
political agendas and in variance with avowed norms and standards.6" Such questioning has great implications in society's decision regarding at what stage to regulate, and " [i] t is easy to fail to
see the need for regulating science if we presume that science generally works as it ought to."6 6
None of these observations is intended to detract from the
usefulness and creativity found in this book. In all, Professor
Goldberg has made an important contribution to the study of law
and science. Its focus on modern content makes it highly readable
and relevant to this new field which promises to grow within the
coming years.

65 See generallyJoan H. Fujimura, Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary
Ojects, and "Translation",in SCIENCE AS PRACTICE AND CULTURE 168 (Andrew Pickering
ed. 1992).
66 Fuller, supra note 61, at 407.

